In this work, we first prove the capacity of coded, linear symmetric private information retrieval (SPIR) in the presence of colluding, adversarial, and nonresponsive servers, giving a positive closure to the conjecture stated by Tajeddine et al. It is also shown that, further restricting to strongly-linear PIR schemes with linear interference cancellation, the so-called star product scheme proposed by Freij-Hollanti et al. is optimal. This observation enables to prove the capacity of strongly-linear (non-symmetric) PIR schemes for any number of files. Further, it also provides a positive proof in this practical special case for the conjectures stated in the asymptotic regime by Freij-Hollanti et al. and Tajeddine et al.
I. INTRODUCTION
User privacy has increased its importance together with the increasing usage of distributed services such as cloud storage and various peer-to-peer networks. Recently, private information retrieval (PIR) in the context of coded storage has gained a lot of interest. With PIR, a user is able to download a desired file from a database or distributed storage system without revealing the identity of the file to the servers. Several PIR capacity results have been derived in various scenarios, e.g., for replicated [1] and maximum distance separable (MDS) coded [2] storage, colluding servers [3] , single-server PIR with side information [4] , [5] , and symmetric PIR (SPIR) [6] - [8] . Symmetric refers to the property that the user is only able to decode the file that she has requested, and learns nothing about the other files. We will denote symmetric PIR with t-collusion by TSPIR and with additional b Byzantine (and possibly r non-responsive) servers by TBSPIR. It has also been shown that the MDS-property is not necessary for achieving the MDS-PIR capacity [9] , [10] .
In this paper, we close some gaps in the capacity results. First, we will prove Conjecture 2 in [11] . Then, we will develop the concept of a strongly-linear PIR scheme, and prove the capacity of strongly-linear (non-symmetric) PIR schemes for any number of files m in Theorem 4. This also yields a proof in this practical special case for the conjectures stated in the asymptotic regime (m → ∞) in [12, Conjecture 1] and [11, Conjecture 1] . We restate the conjectures later in this section for the ease of reading and numbering. Nonrigorously, the rate of a PIR scheme with m files is denoted and defined as R m = size of the desired file size of the total download .
We denote the asymptotic rate by R := lim m→∞ R m , and call a scheme asymptotically capacity achieving if R = lim m→∞ C m , where C m is the capacity, i.e., the largest achievable rate of a given scheme.
In Table I , we summarize the known asymptotic capacity results relevant to this paper, as well as show the conjectured results [11] , [12] in red. We give a precise problem setup as well as more rigorous definitions for the SPIR rate and capacity later in Section II.
A. Conjectures and contributions
Throughout the paper, we denote a finite field of q elements by F q or shortly F, and a code of length n, dimension k, and minimum distance d by (n, k, d). Here, n can also be thought of as the number of servers in the storage system. Maximum distance separable (MDS) codes satisfying the Singleton bound with equality, i.e., d = n − k + 1, are denoted by (n, k). If the code is linear we write [n, k, d] and (n, k) respectively. We write [n] for the set of integers {i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
Let us now assume n > k +t+2b+r −1, where t, b, r refer to the number of colluding, byzantine, and nonresponsive servers, respectively. Conjecture 1 ( [11], Conjecture 1). The asymptotic capacity (as m → ∞) of PIR from an (n, k)-MDS storage code with t-collusion, b Byzantine servers, and r nonresponsive servers is
, Conjecture 2). The capacity of SPIR from an (n, k)-MDS storage code with t-collusion, b Byzantine servers, and r nonresponsive servers is
In the original version of the above conjectures, the denominator is n−r instead of n. This is due to assuming that we do not download anything from the nonresponsive serves (e.g., the request is dropped after a certain waiting time). For model considerations, here we assume that we download from all the servers, but the results similarly hold for n − r. Conjecture 3 ( [12], Conjecture 1). Let C be an (n, k, d) code with a generator matrix G C that stores m files via the distributed storage system Y = XG C and fix 1 ≤ t ≤ n − k.
Any PIR scheme for Y that protects against any t colluding servers has rate at most
However, Conjecture 3 in its full extent was disproven in [13] , where the authors exhibited an explicit PIR scheme for m = 2 files distributed over n = 4 servers using a rate 1/2 storage code, which protects against t = 2 collusion. The exhibited scheme has rate 3/5, while the conjectured capacity was 4/7. The proposed query scheme is nonlinear.
We refine here the conjecture and state it only for the asymptotic capacity. However, we will show later in Section IV, Theorem 4, that the asymptotic capacity expressions in Conjectures 1 and 4 hold for any strongly-linear PIR scheme regardless of the number of files, under the assumption that all servers respond and their responses have the same size. Conjecture 4. Let m files be stored on a distributed storage system with an (n, k, d) storage code C and fix 1 ≤ t ≤ n − k. Then any linear PIR scheme that protects against any t colluding servers has rate at most R m , where
In what follows, we will prove Conjecture 2, and subsequently provide a proof for Conjectures 1 and 4 in the case that the storage code is MDS and, in addition to the responses, also the query scheme and hence interference cancellation is linear. We coin such a system strongly-linear. From the results it follows that the asymptotic capacity expression in Conjecture 4 actually holds for any strongly-linear PIR scheme for any number of files, see Sec. IV for more details. We would like to emphasize that, even though a proof is given only for strongly-linear schemes in the non-symmetric case, these schemes form a very relevant and practical case in that the respective capacity result is known to be achievable [11] , [12] by a small field size q ≥ n, namely that of a generalized Reed-Solomon code. Moreover, the subpacketization level is independent of m. This is in contrast to the schemes in [1]- [3] , [14] , where each file is assumed to be subdivided into a number of packets that grows exponentially with the number of files m. It was shown in [14] that an exponential (in m) number of packets per file was necessary for a PIR scheme with optimal download rate, under the assumption that all servers respond to the queries and the responses have the same size. In [15] a scheme was presented that achieves the capacity with only O(n) packets by making weaker assumption on the size of the responses than in [14] . 
II. PROBLEM SETUP AND KNOWN RESULTS
We consider a distributed storage system with n nodes (servers) storing m files X i ∈ F 1×k with an (n, k)-MDS storage code, i.e., node j stores the j th column of Y = X ·G, where G is a generator matrix of the storage code. The m files are independent and each consists of k i.i.d. randomly drawn symbols from F q , i.e., for the entropies it holds that
We consider MDS codes, so every k nodes exactly recover the file, i.e., for any set W ⊂ [n] with |W| = k it holds that
A user desiring the file with index i picks the corresponding query Q i = {Q i 1 , . . . , Q i n } from the set of all possible queries Q, and sends Q i j ∈ F 1×m to the j th node. The set of responses from all nodes for a given query is denoted by
For a non-adversarial node j the answer A i j is a function of the query Q i j , the symbols Y j stored at node j and the randomness S shared by the nodes. In this work we only consider PIR schemes in which this function is linear.
Definition 1 (Linear PIR). A PIR scheme is linear if the responses are given by
In general, the goal of information-theoretic private information retrieval with t-collusion is for the user to retrieve a file such that any set of t storage nodes learns nothing about the index of the desired file. This is referred to as user privacy.
Definition 2 (User Privacy with t-Collusion). Any t colluding nodes shall not be able to obtain any information about the index of the requested file, i.e., the mutual information
, |T | = t . We consider symmetric PIR, hence the user is not supposed to learn any information about the files other than the requested one.
Definition 3 (Server Privacy). The user shall learn no information about files other than the requested one, i.e.,
, Q, i) = 0. We are interested in the capacity of linear symmetric PIR with collusion and adversaries, i.e., the highest achievable rate at which a desired file can be retrieved under these constraints when respecting both user privacy and server privacy.
Definition 4 (SPIR Rate and Capacity). The SPIR rate is the number of information bits of the requested file retrieved per downloaded answer bits, i.e.,
.
The SPIR capacity is the supremum of SPIR rates of symmetric PIR schemes for fixed values of n, k, t, b, r.
In order to achieve symmetric privacy, the nodes require some amount of shared randomness.
Definition 5 (Secrecy Rate). The secrecy rate is the amount of common randomness shared by the storage nodes relative to the file size, i.e., ρ SPIR = H(S) H(X i ) . We give some results closely related to the ones presented in this work. Theorem 1 (Capacity of TSPIR [7, Theorem 1] and TB-SPIR [6, Theorem 1]). For linear symmetric private information retrieval from a set of m ≥ 2 files stored on n servers with an (n, k)-MDS code (for replication k = 1), where any t nodes may collude, the capacity is
For symmetric private information retrieval from a set of m ≥ 2 files replicated on n servers, where any t nodes may collude and any b nodes are Byzantine, the capacity is
It is known that when t = 1 or k = 1, the above SPIR capacity coincides with the asymptotic capacity of PIR with no server privacy [2] , [3] . Motivated by this, our aim is to prove that this is the case more generally. Namely, we will first prove Conjecture 2 on SPIR, and then proceed to provide a proof in the case of strongly-linear schemes (cf. Definition 6) for Conjectures 1 and 4, further extending them to the nonasymptotic regime in this case.
III. PROOF OF TBSPIR CAPACITY

A. Converse
Our proof of TBSPIR capacity in a coded setting is largely based on the proofs of TBSPIR capacity in a replicated setting [6] and the proofs of SPIR capacity [8] and TSPIR capacity [7] from MDS coded storage. We follow the same steps, proving the intermediate results for a set of nodes that is free of adversaries and then, similar to [6] , argue that the entropy of the adversarial responses has to be the same as for non-adversarial nodes to obtain the capacity. The proofs follow largely from those of [6]- [8] and are therefore mostly omitted. For complete proofs see the extended version [17] . Lemma 1. For any set N ⊂ [n] of non-adversarial nodes
Proof. The proof follows directly from the proof of [7, Lemma 2] .
As the proof of [7, Lemma 4] is independent of the total number of nodes, the application to our setting is straightforward, when only considering non-adversarial nodes. Lemma 2. For any optimal linear scheme, and for any set N ⊂ [n] of non-adversarial nodes with |N | = k + t − 1,
Proof. The proof follows directly from the proof of [7, Lemma 4].
The following Lemma is similar to [7, Lemma 5], again only differing in that we consider a subset of non-adversarial nodes.
Lemma 3. For any set N ⊂ [n] of non-adversarial nodes with |N | = k + t − 1 it holds that
The proof follows directly from the proof of [7, Lemma 5] .
Up to this point we only considered relations between sets of answers and queries of non-adversarial nodes. Similar to the replicated case in [6, Lemma 6] , in the following we argue that when considering zero error probability, i.e., guaranteeing that the user can decode if the number of corrupted answers is ≤ b and the number of nonresponsive nodes is ≤ r, every realization of n − 2b − r authentic answers has to be unique. Lemma 4. In an optimal scheme with zero error probability for b adversarial and r nonresponsive nodes it holds that H(X i |A i H , Q) = 0, for any set H of honest nodes with |H| ≥ n − 2b − r.
Proof. The setting slightly differs from [6, Lemma 6] in that we do not consider a replicated setting, but a coded storage system. Hence, an adversarial node has only a subset of the information available to an adversary in a replicated setting. However, as we are considering the case of zero error probability, it is sufficient for the adversary to "guess" an answer that prevents the user from correctly decoding the file. Similar to [6, Lemma 6] , assume that for a set R ⊂ [n] with |R| = r of nonresponsive nodes and a set H ⊂ [n] \ R of honest nodes with |H| = n − 2b − r it holds that A i H (X i ) = A i H (X i ) for two different realizations X i and X i of file i. Suppose the answers of n − r responsive nodes are given by
Then a user would not be able to differentiate between the answers for the two realizations, where B 1 is the set of adversaries if X i is the correct realization and vice versa, hence violating the zero error probability requirement.
We are now ready to derive the capacity of linear TBSPIR. Again, the proof is closely related to that of [7] and [6] . Theorem 2. The capacity of linear symmetric PIR from (n, k)-MDS coded storage with b adversarial, r nonresponsive and t colluding nodes is given by
Proof. Let H ⊂ [n] and N ⊂ H be sets of honest, responsive nodes with |H| = n − 2b − r and |N | = k + t − 1. Then Averaging over all sets N gives
By Han's inequality [18] 1
Hence, for some h ∈ H it holds that
. Assuming that the answers of the adversarial nodes are of the same entropy as the non-adversarial answers, since the adversaries could otherwise be easily identified, gives
Achievability: The symmetric version of the scheme introduced in [11] , which generalizes the scheme of [12] , achieves the presented upper bound on the PIR rate.
Remark 2. Note that we include the nonresponsive servers in the calculation of the download cost, which is debatable, due to the reasonable argument that nonresponsive servers do not contribute to this cost. However, this depends on the particular system as, e.g., dropped packets on the side of the user could also cause a missing response, while clearly causing network traffic. Therefore we include the nonresponsive servers in the download cost, but note that this can be modified by changing the upper limit of the sum in (4) to n − r.
Finally, we derive the secrecy rate of TBSPIR by combining the proofs of [7] and [6] . 
Proof. Converse: Let H ⊂ [n] and N ⊂ H be sets of honest, responsive nodes with |H| = n − 2b − r and |N | = k + t − 1.
By server privacy,
. Averaging over all sets N and with (3) we get
The bound on the secrecy rate follows by
IV. STRONGLY-LINEAR PIR CAPACITY
We have seen that, for a symmetric, linear scheme, the rate cannot be larger than that obtained by a star-product scheme in [11] , regardless of the number of files. We will now show that, under stronger linearity assumptions, this is true even without assuming server privacy as in Theorem 2 or an infinite number of files as in Conjecture 4. In essence, we define a strongly linear PIR scheme to be one where all interference cancellation is linear. This is a highly natural assumption, but is not true for schemes such as those in [2] , [3] , which do not satisfy Definition 6 below. For simplicity we only consider linear storage codes here, the generalization to non-linear codes is straight forward and left for an extended version of this work. Definition 6 (Strongly Linear PIR). We say that a linear PIR scheme is strongly linear if each symbol of the desired file is obtained as a deterministic linear function over F of the response vector (A i 1 , . . . A i n ), not depending on the randomness used to produce the queries. Lemma 5. Consider a strongly linear PIR scheme from a linear storage code C. For j = 1, . . . , m, let D i,j ⊆ F n be the linear span of the row vectors (q 1 , . . . , q n ) that can occur as the j th row of a query matrix Q i . Then the rate of the PIR scheme is at most
) .
If the strongly linear PIR scheme downloads equally much from all servers, then the rate is at most
n .
Proof. For linear PIR schemes, i.e., schemes where A j = Q j , Y j , the answers can be described as the sum of the star product (i.e., Hadamard product) of rows of the query matrix and rows of the storage by
where Q(l) denotes the l th row of the query matrix and Y l = X l G is the encoded version of the l th file. Let Φ : A → X i I be the deterministic map that returns the coordinates {X i j : j ∈ I} of the desired file. Then for each l = i, Φ must be constant on each coset of D i,l C, because otherwise changing the query matrix and the l th file would affect the value of Φ(A). Since this holds for every l = i, Φ must be constant on each coset of j =i D i,j C, so
The answer A can be reconstructed from the responses of dim j D i,j C servers, or from n servers if we require to download equally much from each server. Dividing the number |I| of downloaded q-ary symbols from the desired file by the number of q-ary symbols in A, we get the claimed bounds on the PIR rate. This concludes the proof.
For the rest of the paper, we assume downloading the same number of symbols from all the servers for simplicity. We are now ready to show that any strongly linear scheme can be replaced by a star product scheme for the same privacy model, without losing in the PIR rate. Theorem 4 (Capacity of Strongly Linear PIR). Consider a strongly linear PIR scheme from a linear storage code C. Let Q denote the query matrix and let D l be as in Lemma 5 for l = i. Then the rate is bounded by R ≤ 1 − k + t + 2b + r − 1 n for any number of files.
Proof. Define D = l =i D i,l and let
Then there is a coset [e] of D in l D i,l = D + D i,i that has minimal weight r. Let e ∈ F n be a weight r element of this coset. Now the (D, e) star product scheme, as defined in [12] , has a set of feasible query matrices that is more restrictive in the row of the desired file, but less restrictive in the rows of the unwanted files, than the original file. Thus, whatever privacy constraints were satisfied by the original scheme, is also respected by the (D, e) star product scheme. Moreover, by construction the rate of the star product scheme is
, which is at least the rate of the original strongly linear scheme by Lemma 5. So the rate of any strongly linear scheme is bounded from above by the rate of a star product scheme with the same privacy constraints, which is in turn bounded by 1 − k+2b+r+t−1 n as shown in [11] .
Note that the capacity of strongly linear PIR is independent of the number of files. Hence, the above theorem also yields a proof for Conjectures 1 and 4 in the strongly-linear case.
Remark 3. Here, we have assumed that all the servers respond with equal size responses. However, by loosening this assumption, improvements for finite m are possible, along the same lines as in [15] .
